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Abstract 
We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative 
information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking 
option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types’, and thus distinguish 
‘conformists’ from ‘counter-conformists’, and unconditional choosers. Unconditional choosers 
make up the greatest proportion of types (about 80%) while only about 20% of subjects 
condition their responses to social information. We find that both conformity and counter-
conformity are driven by a desire to be seen as moral (the ‘symbolization’ dimension of moral 
identity). The main difference is that, conformity is also driven by a sensitivity to what others 
think (‘attention to social comparison’). Unconditional giving (about 30% of players) on the 
other hand is mainly driven by the centrality of moral identity to the self (the ‘internalization' 
dimension of moral identity). Social information thus seems to mainly affect those who care 
about being seen to be moral. The direction of effect however depends on how sensitive one is to 
what others think. 
 
Key words: dictator game with ‘taking’; social information; conformity; anti-conformity; 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding whether people’s behaviour is influenced by information about what other people 
have done in a similar context has fascinated generations of economists, psychologists, and 
sociologists, who have explored this question for decades and from several angles (Asch, 1951; 
Manski, 1993; Bernheim, 1994; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Shang & 
Croson, 2009).  
The overall pattern of results is that people tend to conform to the behaviour of others, arguably 
because this conveys information about what is normal in a given context and can represent a 
useful heuristic about how to behave: “if others are doing it, it must be a sensible thing to do” 
(Cialdini, 1988). Classic social psychology studies have found that people are influenced by 
what others are doing even in neutral, non-social, settings, such as choosing a consumer product 
(Venkatesan, 1966) or looking up at the sky (Milgram, Bickman & Berkowitz, 1969). In the 
domain of social decisions, it has been proposed that people might also conform to avoid social 
disapproval and gain acceptance from others (Cialdini & Goldsteim, 2004). In social contexts, 
conformity has been observed both when people receive information about the pro-social 
behaviour of others and when they receive information about the anti-social behaviour of others. 
For example, when people are informed about the average voluntary contribution of other 
people, they tend to conform to this contribution (Shang & Croson, 2009; Bicchieri & Xiao, 
2009; Chen, Harper, Konstan and Li, 2010). A similar result holds also when people learn about 
the anti-social behaviour of others. Social psychology field experiments have found report that 
people are more likely to litter in a littered setting, compared to a clean one (Finnie, 1973; Reiter 
& Samuel, 1980; Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). Along the same lines, economic experiments 
using cheating games have found dishonesty to be contagious (Innes and Mitra, 2013; Lauer and 
Untertrifaller, 2019).  
In recent years, however, it has been observed that information about negative behaviour in 
others can also generate counter-conformity, or reactance, among individuals with strong moral 
identities. The intuitive logic is that people with strong moral identities seek to avoid feelings of 
guilt and shame from failing to defend their moral convictions; by counter-conforming they 
maintain a consistent self-concept (Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka, 2012; Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004). Evidence for counter-conformity has been provided mainly in the context of controversial 
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moral issues: when people with strong moral convictions are informed that they are in minority, 
they tend to strengthen their convictions (Hornsey, Smith & Begg, 2007; Aramovich, Lytle & 
Skitka, 2012; Furth-Matzkin & Sunstein, 2017).  
We contribute to this literature by studying conformity and counter-conformity using an 
incentivized economic experiment that proto-typically encapsulates the conflict between a 
positive, pro-social, action, and a negative, anti-social, action: a dictator game with a taking 
option (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). In our setup, dictators can choose to give money to a 
recipient, take money from a recipient, or do nothing (neither give nor take). Social information 
is provided to the dictator prior to making this allocation decision; specifically, they are informed 
that a previous dictator has either given money to a recipient (positive information), taken money 
from a recipient (negative information), or neither given nor taken money (neutral information).  
Do dictators react to the different pieces of information? If so, do they conform, or do they 
counter-conform? And what can we say about the personal characteristics - particularly the 
moral identities - of conformists and counter-conformists? Do counter-conformists have stronger 
moral identities than other player types? To answer these questions, we collect decisions using 
the strategy-method (Brandts & Charness, 2011). This allows us to identify the different 
behavioural strategies that people adopt in response to social information, and hence, to 
distinguish conformists, counter-conformists and unconditional choosers, based on their 
individual responses.  
We also examine the influence of two key predictors, the “Attention to Social Comparison 
Information” (AT-SCI) scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) and the “moral identity” scale (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002). We expect the AT-SCI scale to be an important predictor of conformity in our 
context, because the scale is meant to measure the extent to which people care about what others 
think. Lennox and Wolfe (1984) suggest that individuals who have high degrees of sensitivity to 
what others think tend to avoid negative judgments by others by conforming to what others do. 
Similarly, we expect the moral identity scale to be another important predictor in our context 
because both giving behaviour (Krupka & Weber, 2013; Capraro & Rand, 2018) and counter-
conformity (Hornsey, Smith & Begg, 2007; Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka, 2012) have been linked 
to several measures of morality. Therefore, we expect that these correlates might help understand 
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the personality characteristics of people that are more likely to conform (or counter-conform) in 
response to positive (or negative) information about giving (or taking) behaviour of others. 
 
2. Related literature 
In the standard ‘dictator game’, the dictator is endowed with a sum of money and has to decide 
how much of it, if any, to give to the recipient, who starts the game with nothing. The recipient is 
passive and only receives the amount that the dictator decides to give. In the dictator game with a 
taking option, the receiver is also provided with an initial endowment which can be unilaterally 
taken by the dictator. Dictator games with a taking option were first studied by List (2007) and 
Bardsley (2008), who found that, in this context, fewer dictators were willing to transfer money 
to recipients than in the standard game.  
Previous work on the effect of social information1 on dictators’ behaviour has mainly focused on 
standard dictator games, with no taking option. An earlier paper by Cason and Mui (1998) 
implemented a sequential dictator game in which dictators made an allocation decision before 
and after receiving social information about another dictator. They found that, whereas irrelevant 
information led to declines in giving, giving did not change with social information. Bicchieri 
and Xiao (2009) found that dictator game donations were affected by information regarding the 
most common behaviour of other dictators (descriptive norm) and by information about what 
other participants thought it was the most appropriate thing to do (injunctive norm). Krupka & 
Weber (2009) found that learning about others’ behaviour increased donations in the dictator 
game. Similarly, D’Adda, Capraro and Tavoni (2017) found that informing dictators that about 
half of the dictators in a previous experiment had donated half of their endowment or more, 
increased dictator game donations. Servátka (2009) however found that providing information 
about the behaviour of another dictator did not significantly increase dictator game donations. 
Zafar (2011) found that subjects changed their donations in the direction of the descriptive norm 
(what others were doing) in a dictator game with a charitable cause as the recipient. 
 
1 Social information effects are examined in the literature using different names, including “peer effects”, “social 
influence”, “neighbourhood effects” and “conformity”. 
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There is also an extensive literature using field experiments to examine the impact of social 
information on donations to charitable causes. For example, Shang & Croson (2009) found that 
providing potential donors to a public radio station with information about high contributions by 
other donors had a positive effect on contributions. Frey and Meier (2004) found that students 
who were informed that 64% of students had donated to a charitable organization were more 
likely to donate than students who were informed that 46% of the students had donated. Chen, 
Harper, Konstan and Li (2010) found that below-median contributors increased their voluntary 
contributions to an online community after being informed about the median contribution of 
other users, whereas above median contributors decreased theirs. Goeschl, Kettner, Lohse and 
Schwerien (2018) found that donations to a pro-environmental cause were affected by the 
descriptive norm. In sum, the previous literature indicates that people mostly tend to conform to 
social information regarding the pro-social behaviours of other people.2  
There is rather less experimental evidence regarding the impact of negative social information on 
behaviour compared to positive social information. The only study to date is an unpublished 
work by Eugen Dimant (2019), which uses a dictator game with a taking option and a charitable 
cause as the recipient. In this study, players can revise their original contribution decisions to a 
charity after learning about the contributions of another player. He finds an asymmetric influence 
of social information, with taking/anti-social behaviour having a larger (negative) impact on 
average contributions that giving/pro-social behaviour.  
More broadly, classic studies in social psychology have uncovered that people are more likely to 
litter in a littered setting, compared to a clean one (Finnie, 1973; Reiter & Samuel, 1980; 
Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). In the economic literature, the effect of negative social 
information on behaviour has been examined using cheating games. Innes and Mitra (2013) 
found dishonesty to be contagious: when subjects were informed that the rate of dishonesty in a 
population is high, they were more likely to act dishonestly in a sender-receiver game, compared 
 
2Similar results have been obtained also in behavioural domains other than altruistic giving, such as public goods 
contributions (Bardsley, 2000; Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr, 2001; Croson, 2007; Shang 
& Croson, 2009), effort choices in gift-exchange experiments (Gächter, Nosenzo & Sefton, 2013; Thöni & Gächter, 
2015), second- and third-party punishment (Ho & Su, 2009; Fabbri & Carbonara, 2017), trust (Mittone & Ploner, 
2011), and, in the field, traffic violation (Chen, Lu and Zhang, 2017).  
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to when subjects were informed that the rate of dishonesty is low. Similarly, Lauer and 
Untertrifaller (2019) found people to be more likely to lie after seeing a group member lying. 
While all of the above studies regard conformity, there is little work on counter-conformity. 
Previous work has mainly tested the effect of providing information about a majority opinion 
that is contrary to participants’ held beliefs, on attitudes and/or intentions to speak out against the 
majority view. Hornsey et al. (2003) found that people with strong moral convictions about a 
social issue were more likely to express counter-conformist intentions when they learned that 
they were in a minority, whereas those with weaker moral convictions tended to conform to the 
majority view. Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka (2012) studied the effect of people’s moral 
convictions in resisting conforming to a majority supporting torture. They found that people with 
strong moral convictions against torture were more likely to resist conforming. Similarly, Furth-
Matzkin & Sunstein (2017) observed counter-conformism in response to several governmental 
policies, and the extent of counter-conformism was predicted by the extent to which antecedent 
opinions on the matter were fixed and firm. In the only study to examine whether people exhibit 
counter-conforming behaviour, Hornsey, Smith and Begg (2007) found that, although 
participants showed an intention to counter-conform, this resolve disappeared when they were 
asked to actually act on it. 
Related to our work is also the literature testing the effect of moral preferences on dictator game 
donations. Krupka and Weber (2013) found giving behaviour to be partly driven by preferences 
for doing what others think is the appropriate thing to do. They also found that not giving was 
considered to be less inappropriate than taking, and this helped explain framing effects in the 
dictator game when passing from the give frame to the take frame. Capraro and Rand (2018) and 
Tappin and Capraro (2018) found dictator game donations to be positively correlated to moral 
choices in the so-called Trade-Off game, suggesting that dictator game giving is primarily driven 
by preferences for doing what the dictator thinks it is the morally right thing to do. Capraro and 
Vanzo (2019) found that moral words in the instructions of the dictator game significantly 
impacted dictators’ level of altruism. For example, dictators were less likely to “steal” from the 
recipient than to “take”, despite the fact that, in their experimental context, “stealing” and 
“taking” had the same economic consequences.  
7 
 
In summary, evidence from dictator games as well as from field experiments suggest that people 
are influenced by what other people do. In the context of redistribution behaviours (i.e. giving 
and taking), people tend to conform to social information about positive (pro-social) behaviour 
by others; what remains less clear is how people behave in response to negative (anti-social) 
behaviour in others. The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on how negative social 
information affects behaviour compared to positive social information, and to identify how moral 
identity influences how different individuals react to positive and negative social information.  
 
3. Experimental Design  
We use the dictator game with a taking option, since one of our goals is to examine whether anti-
social information generates counter-conformity. To do this requires an action set containing an 
action (i.e., taking) that is considered to be socially inappropriate, or anti-social. The fact that 
taking in the dictator game is perceived to be socially inappropriate has been shown by Krupka 
and Weber (2013). We also test the same hypothesis on our particular sample, and find it 
confirmed (see Online Appendix 1).  
Hence, we conduct a two-player dictator game with a taking option and with social information, 
as follows. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of two players, in which one player is 
randomly assigned the role of dictator (player A) and the other assigned the role of ‘recipient’ 
(player B). Player A receives an endowment of $1.50, while player B receives $0.50. Player A is 
then informed that s/he will have the chance to give money, take money, or do neither with 
respect to the recipient. The script for player A specifically reads: 
"In your group, you have been randomly selected to receive $1.50. You are player A. The 
other participant in your group will receive $0.50. This person is player B.  
You will now have the chance to give or take some money to/from player B. Specifically, the 
choices available to you are: 
Take $0.50 from player B /// Neither give nor take to/from player B /// Give $0.50 to player B" 
Thus, the options available to player A present thee clear choices: 1) an ‘anti-social’ choice, 
whereby the player maximises her own payoffs (by taking all of player B’s endowment), 2) a 
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‘pro-social’ choice, whereby s/he eliminates unequal distributions (by giving $0.50 to player B), 
and 3) a ‘neutral’ option, by which she chooses to do nothing.  
However, before making this decision, player A is informed she/he has been randomly matched 
with another participant (player C) who has previously made a decision playing a similar dictator 
game with another recipient, the game Player D. (The decisions of Players C were collected in a 
previous experiment3). Player A is then asked to indicate her/his contribution decisions 
conditional on each possible contribution decision made by the other player A. Specifically, the 
text reads: 
“You will be shown each of the other player’s possible decisions. You will then indicate 
whether you prefer to give to, take from, or neither give nor take from player B in your group 
in response to each possible decision by the other player.” 
The reason why we use the strategy method instead of the direct-response method is to be able to 
distinguish conformists from counter-conformists and unconditional choosers at the individual 
level. The order of presentation of the possible choices made by Player C is sequential and 
randomised across all players A. Each time player A receives new information about Player C’s 
possible choice (i.e. the social information), she/he must select a contribution choice in response 
to each. 
Following completion of the distribution task, all players were asked to explain the reason for 
their choices using an open-ended explanations format. This was then followed by two 
psychological scales intended to measure key variables that are expected to influence choices in 
the game: the “moral identity” scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and the “attention to social 
comparison information” scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984).  
The moral identity scale, developed by Aquino and Reed (2002), is used to identify the mental 
representation that an individual may have about her/his moral self (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This 
construct is developed around key moral ‘traits’ that have been found to strongly predict moral 
behaviour (see Aquino & Reed, 2002 for a review of the literature). The reason we add the moral 
identity scale is the following. Previous work suggests that giving in the dictator game is partly 
driven by preferences for doing what one thinks others think it is socially appropriate (Krupka & 
 
3 In a prior study we collected data of a baseline game, with no information regarding another participant’s 
behaviour. We use this data as Player C in this experiment. 
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Weber, 2013) and by preferences for doing what one thinks to be the morally right thing to do 
(Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018; Capraro & Vanzo, 2019). Therefore, we 
expect that both the “importance of being observed to be moral” and the “importance of moral 
identity to intrinsic self-image” will affect Player A’s choice. Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral 
identity scale allows us to measure both these two motivations, as it consists of two subscales 
that distinguish between two dimensions of moral identity: the “internalization” dimension 
(which corresponds to the importance of moral identity to intrinsic self-image), and the 
“symbolization” dimension (which corresponds to the importance of being observed to be 
moral). We also expect that the extent to which Player A responds to information about the 
choice of Player C is related to the extent to which Player A cares about being seen as moral. 
Therefore, we expect that the moral identity scale, and especially its symbolization dimension, is, 
in our experimental context, related to conformity.  
The other scale we use - the AT-SCI scale, developed by Lennox and Wolfe (1984) - is used as a 
proxy measure of preferences for conformity. This scale specifically measures an individual’s 
sensitivity to social comparison. Lennox and Wolfe (1984) suggest that individuals who have 
high degrees of sensitivity to what others think (i.e. social comparison) tend to avoid negative 
judgments by others. The AT-SCI measure has been found to moderate the influence of norms 
on behavioural intentions (Chiou, 1998; Beardon & Rose, 1990) and judgments (Yoon, La Ferle 
& Edwards, 2016), such that higher ATSCI individuals are more likely to conform to social 
norms or information. Therefore, we expect high scores in the AT-SCI scale to be related to 
conformity in our dictator game with information. 
We also include some demographic questions. We focus in particular on gender, since previous 
analyses suggest that females are more altruistic than males (Engel, 2010; Rand et al., 2016; 
Brañas-Garza, Capraro & Rascón-Ramírez, 2018), on age, because previous work suggests a 
positive effect of age on giving (Engel, 2010), and on religiosity, because previous work 
suggests that religious primes increase giving (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007; Shariff et al., 2016; 
but see Gomes & McCullough, 2015).  
In the Appendix we report the exact empirical instructions, including the moral identity scale and 
the AT-SCI scale. 
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4. Results 
4.1.  Participants 
The experiment was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT experiments are 
simple and inexpensive, because participants play from their own computers or smartphones by 
completing an online incentivized survey that takes usually less than ten minutes. This allows 
experimenters to significantly decrease the stakes at play, without compromising the results. 
Several works have shown that data collected using AMT are of similar quality than those 
gathered using the standard laboratory (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010; Horton, Rand & 
Zeckhauser, 2011; Berinski, Huber & Lenz, 2012;  Goodman, Cryder & Cheema, 2013; Paolacci 
& Chandler, 2014). Furthermore, compared to standard experiments, AMT studies use samples 
that are more heterogeneous than the standard laboratory samples, which are typically made of 
students (Berinski et al., 2012). On the negative side, some studies have highlighted potential 
issues with collecting data on AMT, including non-comprehension and, more recently, the 
presence of AMT workers using Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to participate multiple times in an 
experiment; critically, these workers provide exceptionally low quality data (Dennis, Goodson & 
Pearson, 2019). To increase data quality, we recruited participants with an AMT approval rate 
greater than 95% (AMT keeps track of this information and allows experimenters to filter out 
participants accordingly), we asked participants comprehension questions to make sure that they 
understood the crucial parts of the experiment (see below for details about the comprehension 
questions), and we checked for multiple IP addresses and multiple Turk IDs (in case we find 
duplicates, we keep only the first observation, as determined by their starting date). 
Participants were located in the US. After providing informed consent, they were presented with 
the experimental instructions, followed by two questions testing comprehension. One question 
asked which choice by Player A would maximize Player A’s payoff; the other question asked 
which choice by Player A would maximize Player B’s payoff. Only participants who correctly 
answered both questions were allowed to complete the experiment; the other participants were 
automatically excluded. In doing so, we collected a total of 313 player A’s and 311 player B’s 
(females = 48%, mean age = 38 years). 
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4.2. Mean transfers in response to social information  
We begin by looking at whether the type of information regarding Player C’s behaviour (take, do 
nothing, or give) impacts Player A’s mean transfer. Results in Table 1 suggests the existence of a 
positive trend such that Player A’s mean transfers depend positively on the information received 
about the behaviour of Player C. Results of a repeated measures ANOVA confirm this intuition, 
by revealing statistically significant differences in mean transfers in response to different 
information amounts (F(2, 624) = 5.35, p < 0.005). Results of a Friedman test (the non-
parametric equivalent to the repeated measures ANOVA) confirm these findings (p<0.001) 4. 
 
Table 1.  Mean Player A transfer by social information (n=313) 
Information about 
Player C’s transfer 
Mean transfer of 
Players A 
Std error 
-$0.50 $0.00 0.024 
 $0 $0.02 0.023 
+$0.50 $0.04 0.024 
 
 
4.3.   Distribution of transfers in response to social information  
Next, we explore whether positive, negative or neutral social information impact the distribution 
of choices of Players A. Figure 1a shows the distribution of transfer choices (take/neither/give) 
by social information for the entire dataset, with each panel representing a different social 
information amount. Figure1b shows the distribution only for those players that actually 
conditioned their transfer choices in some way to the social information provided. These 
represent 20% of the full sample - the other 80% of players did not condition their transfer 
choices to the social information provided. As a consequence, the distributions of choices made 
 
4 A more detailed examination of the underlying regression model corresponding to our ANOVA model shows that 
only pro-social (‘giving’) information has a positive effect on transfers compared to anti-social (‘taking’) 
information (p=0.001). There is no significant difference between the effect of negative and status quo information 
on mean transfers (p=0.147). Pairwise comparisons (reported in Online Appendix 2) confirm these findings. 
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by Players A tend to be relatively stable when the information regarding Player C’s behaviour 
varies (Figure 1a). If we restrict the analysis to those Players A who do change their choice as a 
function of Player C’s behaviour, we observe greater variability (Figure1b). Results of a Stuart-
Maxwell test for marginal homogeneity confirm that the distributions in Figures 1a and 1b are 
significantly different from each other (p<0.001).5 
 
a. Distribution of Player A’s transfers by information about Player C’s behaviour – all Players 
A (n=313) 
 
b. Distribution of Player A’s transfers by information about Player C’s behaviour – only 
Players A who change transfer in response to Player C’s behaviour (n=65) 
 
Figure 1. Distributions of transfers made by Players A by social information. Panel a. 
reports the full sample of Players A; panel b. reports only those Players A who change their 
transfer in response to the social information received about Player C.  
 
 
5This result is identical for the full sample and the conditional sample, due to the fact the Stuart-Maxwell test uses 
only changing frequencies in the calculation. 
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Having established that the distributions of transfers are statistically different from one another, 
we now investigate in more detail the impact of each type of information about Player C’s 
behaviour on stated transfers made by Players A. To do this, we focus on the subsample of 
Players A that actually conditioned their choices on the social information provided (Figure 1b). 
Table 2 reports results of McNemar pairwise tests. 
Starting from the case in which Players A receive neutral information about the behaviour of 
Player C (central panel of Figure 1b), we note that the majority of these Players A (60% of the 
conditional subsample) select the same choice, “neither give nor take”, towards Player B; 
moreover, the proportion of Players A selecting this choice in response to neutral social 
information is significantly higher than the proportion of Players A selecting this choice in 
response to negative (23.1%) and positive (33.9%) social information. This suggests that Players 
A tend to conform to neutral information about Player C’s behaviour.  
 
Table 2. McNemar tests of proportions of Player A’s that condition their responses on 
social information (n=65). Significance levels: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 
Comparison  Exact McNemar Test 
p-value 
% Players A taking in response to negative information vs          
% Players A taking in response to neutral information 
0.0005*** 
% Players A taking in response to negative information vs          
% Players A taking in response to positive information 
0.0023*** 
% Players A doing nothing in response to neutral information vs 
% Players A doing nothing in response to negative information 
0.001*** 
% Players A doing nothing in response to neutral information vs 
% Players A doing nothing in response to positive information 
0.0095*** 
% Players A giving in response to positive information vs          
% Players A giving in response to negative information 
0.1325 
% Players A giving in response to positive information vs          
% Players A giving in response to neutral information 
0.0113** 
 
 
Moving now to Players A who receive positive information about the behaviour of Player C 
(right panel of Figure 1b), we note that the majority of these players (50.8%) select the same 
choice, “give”, towards Player B; moreover, the proportion of Players A selecting this choice in 
response to positive information is significantly higher than the proportion of Players A selecting 
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this choice in response to neutral information (26.2%), but not significantly higher than the 
proportion of Players A selecting the same choice in response to negative information (35.4%). 
This suggests that, while Players A tend to conform to positive information, responses to 
negative social information are less conforming.   
Indeed, looking now at Players A receiving negative information about the behaviour of Player C 
(left panel of Figure 1b), we note that this time Players A are more split, as 41.5% decide to take 
the $0.50 from the corresponding Player B, while a similar proportion (35.4%) decide to give. 
This shows that some Players A conform to negative information, while a non-negligible 
proportion of other Players A counter-conform to negative information. Evidence of conformity 
is confirmed by the fact that the proportion of Players A exhibiting ‘taking’ behaviour in 
response to negative information is significantly higher than the proportion of Players A 
exhibiting taking behaviour in response to positive (15.4%) and neutral (13.9%) information. On 
the other hand, the proportion of Players A who “give” in response to negative information 
(35.4%) is numerically but not statistically greater (McNemar test p=0.2632) than the proportion 
of Players A who “give” in response to neutral information (26.2%). This suggests that counter-
conformity is relatively rare6. We expand on this in the next section. 
 
4.4. Individual heterogeneity and its determinants 
Summary statistics reported above suggest that there are different responses to social 
information. In this section, we aim to identify precisely the range of individual strategies that 
people adopt when responding to social information. To do this, Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients were computed for each player. This determines the strength and direction of the 
monotonic relationship between variables, and is the approach used in other studies of player 
heterogeneity (e.g. Gachter, Gerhards & Nosenzo, 2017; Fischbacher, Gachter & Fehr, 2001). 
For individuals whose transfer choices did not vary with social information, we could not 
compute Spearman rank correlations. Hence, mean transfer was used to classify these individuals 
as ‘unconditional givers’, ‘unconditional takers’ and ‘unconditional status quo’.   
 
6 If counter-conformity were more prevalent, we would have expected significantly higher levels of giving in 
response to negative social information compared to neutral or positive social information, as a result of the 
reactance of players with strong moral identities in response to socially inappropriate behaviour.   
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We thus define six subject ‘types’ based on their behavioural strategies, as follows:  
• “Conformists”: Players A displaying a (weakly) positive correlation between their 
transfer and the information received regarding the transfer made by Player C;  
• “Counter-conformists”: Players A displaying a (weakly) negative correlation between 
their transfer and the information received regarding the transfer made by Player C;  
• “Unconditional takers”: Players A who take the $0.50 from Player B, regardless of the 
information received about Player C’s choice;  
• “Unconditional givers”: Players A who give the $0.50 to Player B, regardless of the 
information received about Player C’s choice;  
• “Unconditional status quo”: Players A who do nothing, regardless of the information 
received about Player C’s choice;  
• “Others”: Players A who do not belong to any of the previous classes. 
Table 3 reports the distribution of types. Results show that about 80% of players did not 
condition their choices in response to social information about Player C’s choices. This leaves 
only 20.76% of all players that actually conditioned their transfer choices in response to social 
information. Of these, about 15% consistently conditioned their behaviour to social information, 
most of whom displayed conformist strategies (10.86%). Only 5.43% displayed counter-
conformist strategies, confirming the earlier suggestion that counter-conformity is a rare 
behavioural strategy. The remaining 4.47% did not show consistent behaviour. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of subject types  
Types Freq. Percent 
Conformist 34 10.86 
Counter-conformist 17 5.43 
Unconditional taker 86 27.48 
Unconditional status quo 72 23.00 
Unconditional giver 90 28.75 
Other (u- and inverse-u shapes) 14 4.47 
Total 313 100 
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To gain insight on the influence of moral identity and sensitivity to social comparison on the 
behavioural strategy adopted, we ran multinomial logit regressions, where the dependent variable 
is player type and the reference type is “unconditional taker”. The models include key socio-
economic variables (gender, age, and income), religiosity, moral identity (divided into both 
subscales)7 and AT-SCI8 (as an indicator of conformity). In addition, we include the value of the 
first amount presented to players (recall that Players A’s choices were elicited using the strategy 
method, in which social information regarding the potential choices of Players C was presented 
sequentially and in random order) to control for possible anchoring effects on the strategy 
adopted.  
Table 3 summarizes the results. Not surprisingly, those classed as ‘conformists’ tend to score 
higher on the AT-SCI scale, compared to those who were classed as unconditional takers, 
suggesting that the likelihood of being a ‘conformist’ type increases with individual sensitivity to 
social comparison (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). With regards to the moral identity subscales, we 
find that a higher score on the internalization subscale increases the likelihood of being an 
‘unconditional giver’, which is in line with recent empirical evidence showing that giving in the 
dictator game is primarily driven by moral preferences (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & 
Capraro, 2018; Capraro & Vanzo, 2019). Conversely, a higher score on the symbolization 
subscale increases the likelihood that players select counter-conformist and, to a lesser extent, 
conformist behavioural strategies. This suggests that both conformism and counter-conformism 
are primarily driven by a desire to appear moral, rather than by an intrinsic moral identity.   
In terms of demographic influences, females are more likely than males to adopt unconditional 
status quo strategies compared to unconditional taking strategies (and, to a lesser extent, 
unconditional giving strategies). This is partly in line with several meta-analyses showing that 
females give, on average, more than males in the dictator game (Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016; 
Brañas-Garza et al., 2018). Household income and age have only weak or no statistically 
 
7We averaged the overall responses to all items and identified within-scale reliabilities using Cronbach’s alpha 
which measures internal consistency, with values closer to 1 being more reliable. Our results show high internal 
reliability for both the internalization and symbolization scale, with Cronbach’s alphas of 0.81 (with mean=6.22 and 
sd=0.88)) and 0.90 (mean= 4.01, sd=1.45). The overall within scale reliability was 0.86 (overall mean=5.11 and 
sd=0.98). This indicates that our data are internally consistent.  
8 As with the moral identity scale, we averaged responses over all items (mean 2.40 (sd 0.88)), and assessed within-
scale reliability using Cronbach’s alpha, which was 0.89. This shows that our data are internally consistent. 
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significant influences on the likelihood of adopting any single strategy. Also, religiosity has no 
effect on strategy. This is surprising, because previous research shows that religious primes make 
people more pro-social (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007; Shariff et al., 2016; but see Gomes & 
McCullough, 2015). However, we note that the coefficient of the unconditional givers for 
religiosity is the only one to be positive, and also the standard error is relatively small; therefore, 
it is possible that we failed to detect a significant effect of religiosity on unconditional giving, 
because of insufficient statistical power.  
Finally, we find that the first amount presented to Player A using the strategy method (the 
‘anchor’), has a weak influence on the likelihood of adopting a counter-conformist, or ‘other’ 
strategy.  This confirms findings in O’Garra and Sisco (2019) that anchors may affect the 
behavioural strategy adopted.  
 
Table 4. Multinomial Logit Model of Player Types  
 Conformist Counter-
conformist 
Unconditional 
status quo 
Unconditional 
giver 
Other 
AT-SCI (“conformity” scale) 0.710** 0.424 0.206 -0.101 0.273 
 (0.290) (0.357) (0.202) (0.196) (0.366) 
Moral identity (internalization) 0.013 0.285 -0.050 0.987*** -0.116 
 (0.258) (0.402) (0.192) (0.255) (0.375) 
Moral identity (symbolization) 0.300* 0.544** 0.185 0.126 0.545** 
 (0.170) (0.231) (0.135) (0.130) (0.249) 
Female 0.669 0.665 0.879** 0.664* 1.244* 
 (0.450) (0.586) (0.348) (0.350) (0.638) 
Age 0.031* 0.021 0.013 0.026* 0.039 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) 
Household income (/1000) -0.006 -0.013 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) 
Religiosity -0.265 -0.345 -0.009 0.218 -0.258 
 (0.268) (0.349) (0.207) (0.205) (0.379) 
Anchor: Status Quo  -0.151 -1.286* -0.476 -0.302 -1.506* 
 (0.601) (0.761) (0.427) (0.418) (0.901) 
Anchor: Give  0.389 -0.895 -0.385 -0.388 -0.604 
 (0.549) (0.648) (0.409) (0.405) (0.676) 
Constant -4.705** -5.634** -1.595 -7.578*** -4.469* 
 (1.683) (2.561) (1.166) (1.671) (2.321) 
Chi2 95.63***     
n 313     
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We explored how information about the behaviour of a third party affects redistribution 
behaviour in a dictator game with a taking option. Compared to previous literature, our design 
proposes three main innovations. First, we did not only look at the effect of positive social 
information, but also investigated the effect of information about the anti-social behaviour of 
others. Second, we used the strategy method to examine how individual participants changed 
their choices as a function of the social information received, which allowed us to identify 
different behavioural ‘types’, namely: ‘conformists’, ‘anti-conformists’ and unconditional 
choosers. Third, we explored the determinants of behavioural types using suitable psychological 
scales, specifically, the “moral identity” scale and the “attention to social comparison 
information” scale. In doing so, our data provided evidence for a number of novel results.  
Whilst the majority of participants (80%) were not affected by social information, about 15% of 
the participants consistently conditioned their behaviour to the information received; among 
these, about 10% conformed, and about 5% counter-conformed to the behaviour of a third party. 
The remaining 5% did not show consistent behaviour. The investigation of heterogeneous 
individual strategies also revealed some interesting patterns: individuals classed as 
‘unconditional givers’ were more likely to have strongly internalized moral identities (as per the 
‘internalization’ dimension of the moral identity scale). On the other hand, individuals classed as 
‘conformists’ as well as those classed as ‘counter-conformists’, were mostly influenced by a 
desire to be seen as moral (as measured using the ‘symbolization’ dimension of the moral 
identity scale). However, conformists also showed concern for what others think (as measured by 
the ‘attention to social comparison’ scale). Thus, our results suggest that social information 
mainly affects those who care about being seen to be moral, at least in what regards 
redistribution choices. The direction of effect however depends on how sensitive one is to what 
others think.    
These results confirm and go beyond previous literature in several dimensions. In the Related 
Literature section, we reviewed studies finding that participants who receive positive social 
information tend to conform. We replicated this finding, and also showed that, when participants 
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receive negative social information (i.e. information about a third-party taking money from 
recipients in a dictator game), some of them conformed to this negative behaviour, but others 
counter-conformed. The finding that some participants adopt counter-conformist behaviour in 
response to negative social information, is, to the best of our knowledge, new, although it relates 
to the recent line of evidence that people with strong moral convictions exhibit counter-
conformist attitudes and intentions in response to information that goes against their prior moral 
and political beliefs (Hornsey, Smith & Begg, 2007; Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka, 2012; Furth-
Matzkin & Sunstein, 2017).  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to explore the personality determinants of 
conformity and counter-conformity, at least in the domain of giving and taking behaviour. We 
found that, in our context, both conformity and counter-conformity were driven by a desire to be 
seen as moral. This result can be useful in terms of applications. Future work could test whether 
moral salience can increase people’s conformity to positive behaviours and people’s reactance to 
negative behaviours. However, we also found that conformity was also driven by a sensitivity to 
what others think. Future work could test whether individuals who are sensitive to social 
comparison respond equally to social information provided by in-group members and social 
information provided by out-group members. If explicitly faced with information about the 
behaviour of out-group members, might these individuals change their behavioural strategy from 
conformist to counter-conformist?  This research can contribute to the emerging stream of 
literature using moral suasion to encourage pro-social behaviours (Brañas-Garza, 2007; Ferraro 
& Miranda, 2013; Dal Bó & Dal Bó, 2014; Bonan, Cattaneo, d’Adda & Tavoni, 2019; Bott, 
Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodden, in press; Capraro et al., in press). 
Finally, our results also confirm previous work showing that giving is partly driven by moral 
preferences for doing the right thing (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018; Capraro 
& Vanzo, 2019). We add to this line of research by highlighting that moral preferences may not 
just increase giving, but indeed may do so in contexts where other people are observed to do 
quite the opposite.  
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Online Appendix 
 
1. Perceived Morality of Different Redistribution Choices 
To identify perceptions of the morality of the various possible transfer choices (give, take, 
neither), we asked Players B to indicate on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1=extremely moral/bad, and 
7=extremely moral/good) how moral they considered each of these choices. This question was 
asked prior to informing them that they had been assigned the role of player B, to avoid bias in 
terms of how they responded to the questions. We did not ask Players A to avoid influencing 
their choices. Results show that ‘taking’ was rated as immoral (mean rating of 2.23), whereas 
‘giving’ was rated as moral (mean rating of 6.22 on the scale). ‘Neither giving nor taking’ was 
rated as 4.14, thus perceived as marginally more moral than immoral (assuming a rating of “4” 
indicates ‘neither moral nor immoral’). Paired pairwise t-tests comparing the mean perceived 
morality of each possible decision indicate that these ratings are all significantly different for 
each other (all p-values<0.001). 
 
 
2. Testing Difference between Mean Transfers 
 
Table 5. Pairwise Paired Two-Tailed T-tests and Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests (n=313) 
Tests of difference between mean transfers by social information  Paired t-test 
(p-value) 
Sign rank test 
(p-value) 
H0: mean transfer in response to ‘take’ = mean transfer in response to ‘give’ 0.0049*** 0.0145** 
H0: mean transfer in response to ‘take’ = mean transfer in response to ‘neither’ 0.1089 0.1539 
H0: mean transfer in response to ‘give’ = mean transfer in response to ‘neither’ 0.0507* 0.0354** 
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Screen 1 
--ALL PLAYERS-- 
Please read the following information carefully: 
  
You are invited to take part in a study that investigates choices made by individuals in group 
settings. Participants will be asked to respond to some questions and make some choices which 
may affect other participants in this survey. No choices will be traced back to any one individual. 
   
 
The following list of items summarises all important things you should know before 
proceeding with this study. 
1. You must be over 18 to participate. 
2. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time. 
3. Participation in the tasks will not incur any financial expense by you. 
4. Some of the tasks may involve monetary reward.  Any earnings will be relatively small and 
related to the decisions you and other participants make. 
5. If you agree to participate in the study, you are expected to fulfil the obligations related to the 
study. That is, respond to the tasks assigned to you for the duration of the study.   
6. There are no known physical risks involved in this procedure and the tasks do not require any 
special physical or psychological attitudes or any specific knowledge of any kind.  
7. You will not be knowingly deceived in any form. 
8. During this study we may ask you for some personal information. For instance, your gender, 
level of education, personal income level, etc. 
9. CONFIDENTIALITY: The information you provide will be treated in full confidence and 
will be legally protected. It will never be associated with you personally in any form. No 
person-identifiable information will be reported in any published or unpublished work. Non-
person identifiable data may be made publicly available.  All electronic files will be saved 
but treated in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
Consent: 
If you agree to the terms of this study and wish to continue with this study, then please proceed 
to the next page. 
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Screen2 
Thank you for participating in this study.  
 
Important: Please do not use the 'Back' and 'Forward' buttons in your browser. 
  
You will earn a $0.75 participation fee for completing the study. You will also have the chance 
of earning more money. The extra amount earned will depend on the choices that you and other 
participants make during the survey. 
  
When you are ready, please move to the next page to start the study. 
 
 
Screen 3 Explanation Set-up (All players) 
For the purpose of this study, you have been randomly assigned to a group of 2 Mechanical Turk 
participants, including yourself.  
 
  
Two bonus payments of $1.50 and $0.50 will be randomly allocated to each ONE of you. 
 
The participant who receives $1.50 will be known as player A. 
  
The participant who receives $0.50 will be known as player B.  
  
If you are randomly selected to receive $1.50, you will have the opportunity to either give some 
of your own bonus to player B, or take some of the bonus received by player B. 
    
The other person in your group is REAL - there is no deception in this study. This is the only 
interaction that you will have with the other participant. He or she will not be able to influence 
your bonus in later parts of the experiment 
 
 
The following questions are designed to test whether you have read and understood the above 
scenario.  
 
You MUST answer the next two questions correctly to continue with the HIT and receive your 
participant fee and bonus!  
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Screen 4 (Comprehension Test 1) 
Q1. If you have been randomly selected to be player A, how much should you give or take 
to/from player B, so that you and player B earn the same amount? 
 
Amount Check one only 
Take $0.50   
Neither give nor take  
Give $0.50  
 
GO TO SCREEN 5 
 
Screen 5 (Comprehension Test 1) 
Q2. If you have been randomly selected to be player A, how much should you give or take 
to/from player B to maximize your earnings? 
 
Amount Check one only 
Take $0.50   
Neither give nor take 
 
Give $0.50   
 
 
IF CORRECTLY ANSWERED Q1 & Q2: GO TO SCREEN 7 
IF NOT: END OF PARTICIPATION 
 
 
Screen 7 Selection (Text) 
The computer will randomly select one participant in your group to receive the $1.50 bonus 
(player A), and one participant to receive $0.50 each (player B). 
   
Please note: you MUST complete the entire study to receive your participation payments and any 
earned bonus payments. 
  
Please move to the next page. 
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Screen 8: Role assignment (player A); explanation of decisions faced 
 
In your group, you have been randomly selected to receive $1.50. You are player A. 
 
  
  
The other participant in your group will receive $0.50. This person is player B.  
 
   
  
You will now have the chance to give or take some money to/from player B. Specifically, the 
choices available to you are: 
 
Take $0.50 from  
player B 
 Neither give nor take to/from 
player B 
 Give $0.50 to  
player B 
 
 
However, before you make this decision, you will be randomly matched with another player A 
who has already decided whether to give to, or take from, player B in their group.  
You will be shown each of the possible decisions that the other player A can make.  
 
You will then indicate whether you prefer to give to, take from, or neither give nor take from 
player B in your group conditional on each possible decision by the other player A. 
 
Please note that all your decisions are potentially binding and cannot be changed. 
 
Please move to the next page. 
 
GO TO SCREEN 10  
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Screen 10 Transfer decision (Player A) 
 
Now, please indicate how much money you wish to give to or take from player B in your group 
conditional on the other player A’s possible choices. 
 
Please note: all transfer decisions are confidential and will not be traced back to you. 
 
-- RANDOMISE OPTIONS -- 
 
If the other player A chose to GIVE $0.50 to player B in their group, then I choose to:  
 
 (select one): 
Take $0.50 from  
player B in my group 
Neither give nor take to/from 
player B in my group 
Give $0.50 to  
player B in my group 
         
 
 
If the other player A chose to NEITHER GIVE NOR TAKE to/from player B in their group, 
then I choose to: 
 
 (select one): 
Take $0.50 from  
player B in my group 
Neither give nor take to/from 
player B in my group 
Give $0.50 to  
player B in my group 
         
 
 
If the other player A chose to TAKE $0.50 from player B in their group then I choose to:  
 
 (select one): 
Take $0.50 from  
player B in my group 
Neither give nor take to/from 
player B in my group 
Give $0.50 to  
player B in my group 
         
 
 
Screen 11 
You have now made your decisions conditional on the other player A’s choices. You will find 
out the other player A’s choice - and hence which of your decisions applies - when you receive 
your payment after this experiment. 
 
Screen 12 Reasons for transfer decision 
 
Can you explain in a few sentences how you made your decisions?  
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SCREEN 13: MORALITY OF BEHAVIOUR QUESTION 
-- ALL PLAYER B’s ONLY -- 
Before you find out which role you have been randomly assigned to, please indicate on a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1=extremely immoral/bad and 7=extremely moral/good, how moral you consider 
the following behaviours: 
 extremely 
immoral/b
ad 
1 2 3 
neither 
moral nor 
immoral 
4 5 6 
extremely 
moral/goo
d 
7 
Taking $0.50 from 
player B 
       
Neither give nor take 
to/from player B 
       
Giving $0.50 to player 
B 
       
 
 
 
Screen 14: Role assignment; player B text 
 
-- ALL PLAYER B’s -- 
 
In your group, you have been randomly selected to receive $0.50. You are player B. 
 
  
  
The other participant in your group will receive $1.50. This person is player A.  
 
   
  
Player A will now have the chance to give or take some money to/from you.  
 
You will learn how much they chose to give or take when you receive your payment after 
completing the study. 
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-- ALL PLAYERS FROM SCREEN 15 ONWARDS– 
 
Screen 15: MORAL IDENTITY 
 
Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person:  
 
caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind. 
 
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else.  
 
For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine 
how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person 
would be like, answer the following questions. 
 
For each question below: 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree) 
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics. 
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.  
3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.  
4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics.  
5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these 
characteristics 
6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics. 
7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.  
8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in 
certain organizations. 
9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these 
characteristics.  
10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.  
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Screen 17: CONFORMITY (ASCI scale) 
Now, please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
(For each question below, 5-point Likert scale: 0 = completely disagree to 5=completely agree). 
1 It is my feeling that if everyone else in a group is behaving in a certain manner, this must 
be the proper way to behave. 
2 I actively avoid wearing clothes that are not in style. 
3 At parties I usually try to behave in a manner that makes me fit in. 
4 When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for 
cues. 
5 I try to pay attention to the reactions of others to my behavior in order to avoid being out 
of place. 
6 I find that I tend to pick up slang expressions from others and use them as part of my 
own vocabulary. 
7 I tend to pay attention to what others are wearing. 
8 The slightest look of disapproval in the eyes of a person with whom I am interacting is 
enough to make me change my approach. 
9 It’s important to me to fit in to the group I’m with. 
10 My behavior often depends on how I feel others wish me to behave. 
11 If I am the least bit uncertain as to how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior 
of others for cues. 
12 I usually keep up with clothing style changes by watching what others wear. 
13 When in a social situation, I tend not to follow the crowd, but instead behave in a 
manner that suits my particular mood at the time  
 
Screen 18: Gender 
Thanks! A few more questions about yourself: 
 
Are you..? (Check one only)  
[ ] female 
[ ] male 
[ ] other 
 
Screen 19: Age 
In what year were you born? 
………… 
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Screen 20: Education 
What is the highest level of education you have received? 
Check one only  
[ ] Less than high school 
[ ] High school/ GED 
[ ] 2-year college degree 
[ ] 4-year college degree 
[ ] Master’s degree 
[ ] Doctoral degree 
[ ] Professional degree (JD, MD) 
 
 
Screen 21: Household income 
What is your combined annual household income, before tax? Please remember that all answers 
are confidential. Income is a very useful measure for research purposes. 
Check one only  
[ ] Less than $30,000 
[ ] $30,000-$39,999 
[ ] $40,000-$49,999 
[ ] $50,000-$59,999 
[ ] $60,000-$69,999 
[ ] $70,000-$79,999 
[ ] $80,000-$89,999 
[ ] $90,000-$99,999 
[ ] $100,000-$124,999 
[ ] $125,000-$149,999 
[ ] $150,000 or more 
 
 
Screen 22: political tendency 
Do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, Republican, Independent or Other? 
Check one only  
[ ] Democrat 
[ ] Republican 
[ ] Independent 
[ ] Other 
 
Screen 23: Religiosity  
How strongly do you believe in the existence of a God or Gods? 
1 = not at all 
2=somewhat 
5 = very much 
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